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THE HIGH COURT ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE 2003
STATISTICS
ANDREW LYNCH* AND GEORGE WILLIAMS**
I INTRODUCTION
The statistics set out below present information on the High Court's decision-
making at both an institutional and individual level for 2003, with an emphasis
on constitutional cases as a subset of the total. They have been compiled using a
methodology developed by the Harvard Law Review for the United States
Supreme Court and adapted for the High Court of Australia, I which has
previously been used to produce an empirical analysis of the first five years of
the Gleeson Court.? We do not outline that method again here. The only
significant difference is that the data collection was done exclusively using the
matters made available on the AustLII database for 2003.3
It is important to acknowledge at the outset the limitations which inhere in any
empirical study over only one year. While the statistics capture what occurred in
2003, the reader should be wary of making broad generalisations about the
behaviour of the Court and its justices. For example, where percentage
calculations have been given in addition to raw figures these should obviously be
treated more warily than those produced after a significantly longer study.
Caution is also warranted in the case of Justices Gaudron and Heydon, neither of
whom served a full year on the Court in 2003.4
With this caveat, the regular presentation of empirical data on the decision
making of the High Court is a valuable means of enhancing understanding of the
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1 Andrew Lynch, 'Dissent: Towards a Methodology for Measuring Judicial Disagreement in the High
Court of Australia' (2002) 24 Sydney Law Review 470.
2 Andrew Lynch, 'The Gleeson Court on Constitutional Law: An Empirical Analysis of its First Five
Years' (2003) 26 University a/New South Wales Law Journal 32.
3 See Australian Legal Information Institute <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cthIHCN2003/> at 9 July
2004.
4 Justice Gaudron retired from the Court on 10 February 2003 and Heydon J was appointed to the Court on
the next day.
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Court's work.' The reader may simply consider the figures presented here as a
stand-alone snapshot of the High Court's constitutional work in 2003, or can
look for the continuation of trends and patterns through comparison with earlier
statistical findings. Either way, the tables are one way of appreciating the Court's
performance and so 'are not an end in themselves but are intended to present a
foundation for more detailed consideration.'6 Some explanation of the tables is
provided, purely for the purpose of clarification rather than as an attempt at
substantive or qualitative analysis. That we leave to those engaged in
commenting on the High Court's performance: who will hopefully find material
of interest and utility in what is presented here.
II STATISTICS
TABLE A - HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA CASES REPORTED FOR
PERIOD
All Cases Reported All Constitutional Cases









The data collection for Table A was done exclusively using the 75 matters
made available on AustLII in its 2003 database for the High Court. Three single-
judge decisions of the High Court were not included in tallying for the purposes
of this study. One case report," which contains three individual matters, was
tallied twice due to the differentiation drawn by the members of the Court in their
judgments."
5 The obvious example of this is the annual presentation of statistics for each term of the United States
Supreme Court that can be found in the pages of the Harvard Law Review. However, less well-known
studies exist and may have a much smaller range of data in one year than either the United States
Supreme Court or the High Court of Australia: see for example, the annual statistics given for the South
African Constitutional Court in the South African Journal on Human Rights since 1995.
6 'The Supreme Court, 1948 Term' (1949) 63 Harvard Law Review 119, 119.
7 New South Wales \' Lepore: Sam in II Queensland; Rich II Queensland [2003] HCA 4; (2003) 195 ALR ,
412.
8 For a detailed explanation of the purpose behind multiple tallying of some cases, see Lynch, above n I,
500--2.
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From this table it can be seen that a total of 73 matters are reported for 2003,
with 16, or close to 22 per cent, being constitutional in character. This
classification is made generously using the presence of constitutional descriptors
or provisions in the catchwords accompanying the judgments." Admittedly, the
degree to which constitutional questions were central to the resolution of these
cases varied. We direct the reader to Justice Sackville's qualitative appraisal of
these matters, in which he states that in 2003 nine cases decided were of
'substantial constitutional importance'. 10 Of these, five were of 'general
importance' whilst the remaining four were of 'more limited significance.' I I We
agree with his assessment of these cases and that the 'other cases decided in 2003
raised less substantial constitutional issues' (of which we have identified seven).
Nonetheless, the employment of this more inclusive criteria to characterise a case
as 'constitutional' has the advantage of being objective, transparent and
replicable by other scholars.
Table A also indicates that disagreement in its most tangible form - opinions
dissenting from the final orders reached by a majority of the Court - was less
prevalent in constitutional matters (37.50 per cent) than in the cases taken as a
whole (50.68 per cent). In fact, if one is to compare these figures with those
which were presented for the five years preceding,'? the percentage of
constitutional cases carrying a dissenting opinion was markedly less in 2003 than
in any previous full year of the Gleeson Court, while the percentage of cases
overall with minority judgments remained steady.
9 While this is a reliable method in respect of the great majority of cases, the quirks of individual editors
can playa part. To take an example from an earlier year than that under review, the case of Wong v The
Queen is reported at (2001) 207 CLR 584 as simply a criminal law matter, despite constitutional
arguments receiving some judicial attention. By contrast, in the report of the case at (2001) 185 ALR 233,
the catchwords do indicate the constitutional aspects of the case. Researchers using different report series
or databases may, as a consequence, produce slightly different figures as a result.
10 Justice Ronald Sackville, 'The 2003 Term: The Inaccessible Constitution' (2004) 27 University of New
South Wales Law Journal 66, 83.
II Ibid.
12 Lynch, above n 2, 42-3.
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TABLE B - CONSTITUTIONAL CASES - HOW RESOL VED13
Table B provides further detail as to how the 16 constitutional cases were
resolved by the Court as comprised of a varying number of justices. The
prevalence of matters in which only six judges presided over a bench comprised
of all seven justices is explained by the time-lag incurred whenever a new justice
joins the bench." As shall be seen from subsequent tables, Justice Heydon's
presence on the bench has yet to fully manifest itself in the opinions of the Court.
13 All percentages given in this table are of the total number of constitutional cases (16).
14 For the curious. the two constitutional cases determined by a bench of three members were Glennan v
Commissioner of Taxation [2003] HCA 31; (2003) 198 ALR 250 and Re Carmodv: Ex parte Glennon
[2003] HCA 32; (2003) 198 ALR 259 , in which s 75(v) of the Constitution was, to a degree, the object of
interpretation.
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TABLE C - SUBJECT MATTER OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASE REPORTS
Topic No. of Case References to Case Reports"
Reports (Italics indicate repetition)
Clause 5 2 31,47
s 5l(i) 1 43
s 5l(ii) 1 3
s 5l(xix) 2 2, 72
s 5l(xxvii) 1 2
s 51(xxix) 2 2,72
s 51(xxxviii) 1 67
s 5l(xxxix) 1 2
s 52 (i) 2 65,66
s 55 1 3
s 75(iii) I 73
s 75(v) 6 2,30,31,32,56,60
s 76 1 47
s 77(iii) 1 47
s 78 1 47
s 80 2 19,20
s 90 I 47
s 106 1 67
s 107 1 67
s 114 1 3
s 117 1 72
s 128 1 67
Table C lists the provisions of the Constitution that arose for consideration in
the 16 matters tallied. The table reveals that a large number of the cases dealt
with issues of judicial power and judicial review. The figures also reflect a
change in the workload of the Court. The tables of judicial workload annexed to
the High Court's 2002-03 Annual Report show a 217 per cent increase in the
number of matters filed by comparison with the previous year. This striking
increase is reflected most dramatically in the Court's original jurisdiction, where
the number of constitutional writs filed increased from 300 to 2131 in 2002-03.
Of those applications, 2105 (or 99 per cent) involved migration matters.
Migration matters made up 82 per cent of all matters filed in the past year. 16
15 The reference numbers given are simply a shorthand citation of the case - the medium-neutral citation for
each of these cases simply requires prefixing the number given with '[2003] HCA'.
16 High Court of Australia, Annual Report 2002-2003 (2003) 8 <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/annuaIJeports/
2003annual.pdf> at 9 July 2004.
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TABLE D(I) - ACTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES: ALL CASES
Number of Participation in Concurrences Dissents
Judgments Unanimous
Judgment
Gleeson 61 3 (4.92%) 53 (86.89%) 5 (8.20%)
CJ
Gaudron J 6 0 5 (83.33%) I (16.67%)
McHugh J 57 7 (12.28%) 43 (75.44%) 7 (12.28%)
Gummow 65 9 (13.85%) 54 (83.08%) 2 (3.08%)
J
Kirby J 65 7 (10.78%) 33 (50.77%) 25 (38.46%)
Hayne J 59 8 (13.56%) 47 (79.66%) 4 (6.78%)
Callinan J 61 6 (9.84%) 46 (75.41 %) 9 (14.75%)
Heydon J 28 3 (10.71%) 23 (82.14%) 2 (7.14%)
While observers of the High Court may have an accurate, although
impressionistic reading of the behaviour of the Court as a whole, it is often more
intriguing to see the patterns of the individual justices themselves - something
that is not always easy to appreciate, except with hindsight. Table D(I) presents
how the judges each handled the work which faced them in 2003. The presence
of Gaudron J is included for the sake of completeness and little store should be
given to the percentage results for her Honour, which bear no comparison with
those of her colleagues who served out the full year. In interpreting the results, it
should also be borne in mind that Heydon J sat on a little less than half of the
matters in which the other justices sat.
For the remaining six justices, the following few features stand out. Chief
Justice Gleeson has joined a noticeably lower proportion of unanimous opinions
in comparison with the rest of the Court, while the other five justices apparently
had greater opportunity to sit on cases in circumstances which were amenable to
the securing of unanimity. Justice Gummow, more often than any other justice
found himself on a bench speaking with one voice." The Chief Justice's limited
involvement in unanimous opinions should not, however, overshadow his very
17 His Honour is assisted in this respect by being one of the three justices sitting on the two unanimous
constitutional cases discussed in respect of Table B. We would stress that a variety of factors must go
towards aiding or abetting the occurrence of unanimity including, obviously, who is sitting with whom
and the nature of the matter before the bench. The Chief Justice's lower rate in comparison with his
Honour's colleagues does not necessarily pertain to his personal judicial style. Indeed his Honour's high
level of concurrence generally would tend to suggest that he is not personally an obstacle to unanimity.
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high rate (the highest) of opinions that concurred in the opinion of the Court.
This may be contrasted with the proportion of concurrences for Kirby J.
Although, his Honour was involved in more unanimous judgments than the Chief
Justice, his rate of agreement with the other justices is otherwise by far the lowest
_ just over 50 per cent of cases on which he sat. On all other occasions, Kirby J
maintained his position as an outsider on the Court with a dissent rate of over 38
per cent for 2003, which is higher than his total dissent percentage for the
preceding five years (34 per cent)." In fact, the place of these six judges along
the spectrum of dissent has not altered in order in 2003 when compared with the
last five years. The justice least likely to find himself disagreeing with a majority
of his colleagues is Gummow J, followed by Hayne J, Gleeson CJ, justices
McHugh and Callinan, and then, by some distance, Kirby J. Individually, they
may have dissented a little more or a little less as a percentage of their caseload
than in the preceding years, but that order remains the same.
TABLE D(II) - ACTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES: CONSTITUTIONAL
CASES
Number of Participation Concurrences Dissents
Judgments in Unanimous
Judgment
Gleeson CJ 14 1 (7.14%) 13 (92.86%) 0
Gaudron J 2 0 2 (100%) 0
..McHugh J 11 1 (9.09%) 9 (81.82%) 1 (9.09%)
~<GummowJ 16 3 (18.75%) 13 (81.25%) 0
.-, Kirby J 14 1 (7.14%) 7 (50%) 6 (42.86%)
'.
(,
Hayne J 13 3 (23.08%) 10 (76.92%) 0
L
,;
14; Callinan J 3 (21.43%) 10 (71.43%) 1 (7.14%)
I' Heydon J 8 1 (12.5%) 7 (87.5%) 0
III Lynch, above n 2, 47.
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Table D(II) records the actions of the justices in the constitutional cases of
2003. Even allowing for the small sample size, there are one or two things of
note. A caveat should be applied in respect of the statistics given for unanimous
judgments - the results for Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ are inflated by their
Honours' constituting a three-bench court for two matters in which discussion of
s 75(v) of the Constitution took place. The third case in which unanimity
occurred - and on which all the justices sat - was the relatively straightforward
matter of Re Maritime Union of Australia; Ex parte CSL Pacific Inc,19 that
concerned s 51(i) of the Constitution.
It is the dissents - or rather the lack thereof - that is most striking about this
Table and which can be appreciated without any qualification. In the five years
prior to 2003, Gummow J dissented in only one constitutional case and that still
stands." Chief Justice Gleeson and Hayne J have also maintained their very low
record for minority opinions by not filing a constitutional dissent in 2003.21
Justices McHugh and Callinan only dissented on one occasion each: the decision .
of Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs ('Shaw').22 Thus,
setting to one side Kirby J's position of disagreement in almost every second
constitutional case - the two most significant being Shaw and Attorney-General
(WA) v Marquet-i - there seemed a remarkable level of consensus across the rest
of the Court than in previous years.
This, of course, is to consider only disagreement in its most explicit form, It
cannot be denied that within the various concurring judgments of the Court's
members there exists ample evidence of divergent reasoning. However, these





(2003) 200 ALR 39.
Lynch, above n 2, 50.
The Chief Justice and Hayne J have only filed dissents in, respectively, two and four constitutional
matters to date.
(2003) 211 CLR 476.
(2003) 202 ALR 143.
22
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TABLE E(I) - JOINT JUDGMENT AUTHORSHIP: ALL CASES
.., r-.. r-..
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Tables E(I) and E(Il) indicate the number of times a particular justice jointly
authored an opinion with his or her colleagues. The most notable aspect of these
tables is the continuation of Justice Gummow's attractiveness as a co-author for
all justices on the Court." With the exception of Kirby J writing marginally more
of his total opinions with McHugh J, Gummow J is the justice over all others
who was most involved injoint opinions with each of his colleagues. This pattern
translates to the constitutional case table (Table E(II)). In all thirteen of the
constitutional matters he sat on in 2003, Hayne J delivered his opinion in concert
with Gummow J - a level of co-operation which no other two judges can match
(again, we can disregard Gaudron J). Even so, Gummow J was still every other
justice's preferred co-author in constitutional matters or was at least tied with
another justice in this position (Kirby J joined just as often with McHugh J or
Hayne J; Callinan J joined Hayne J as often as he did Gummow J).
III CONCLUSION
Doubtless, the reader may find specific features of interest in this material.
Even when taken as a single year on its own, there are patterns of note. Our aim
in presenting this material is to record what occurred amongst the justices of the
High Court in determining the cases of 2003. This should make future
developments and shifts in the Court's work simpler to recognise and perhaps
easier to understand and analyse.
24 This need not necessarily equate to the level of influence which Gummow J personally enjoys on the
Court. In saying that Gummow J has the highest level of concurrence and is the most preferred co-author
of other justices, we are simply recording those facts. It is a mistake to simply assume that Gummow J
therefore is the Court's intellectual leader. Apart from the fact that in any case the statistics show that he
is very closely matched by those around him, it might be just as true to say that he simply best represents
the common ground which exists between the other justices. We offer no opinion here as to which of
those explanations we think is supported by these statistics.
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APPENDIX - EXPLANATORY NOTES
The purpose of the notes contained in this appendix is to identify when and
how discretion has been exercised by the researcher in compiling the statistical
tables discussed throughout this paper. As the editors of the Harvard Law Review
have stated, when explaining their own methodology, 'the nature of the errors
likely to be committed in constructing the tables should be indicated so that the
reader might assess for himself the accuracy and value of the information
conveyed' .25
A Method employed in tallying multiple matter case reports
The following report was tallied multiple times due to distinctions being
drawn between the matters in the judgments and orders made: New South Wales v
Lepore; Samin v Queensland; Rich v Queensland [2003] HCA 4.26 The report
contains three individual matters. Jurisdictional differences led to sufficient
differentiation being drawn by the members of the Court in their judgments
between the two Queensland matters on one hand and Lepore on the other. The
case was tallied as two matters."
B Decisions to tally dissents warranting explanation
1 [2003J HCA 4(ij2s
Justice Callinan is tallied as dissenting because he would allow the appeal in
whole and enter judgment for the appellant, whereas the order of the Court is to
allow it in part and remit.
2 [2003J HCA 3429
Justice Hayne is tallied as dissenting because although he allows the appeal, his
order is to set aside only paragraph 2 of the NSW Court of Appeal's orders,
whereas the order ofthe Court is to set aside paragraphs l, 2 and 3.
25 'The Supreme Court, 1967 Term' (1968) 82 Harvard Law Review 63, 301.
26 (2003)195ALR412.
27 The purpose behind multiple tallying in such circumstances - and the competing arguments - are
considered at length by Lynch, above n I, 500-2. Separate tallying allows disagreement amongst the
bench to be isolated to one specific matter, rather than having it magnified in instances where there is
actually a great deal of consensus. Of course, there are drawbacks to such an approach as well. However,
while multiple tallying inflates raw data, the distorting effect is minimised through greater reliance upon
the percentage figures. And once again, identifying which cases have involved discretion on the part of
the researcher is vital in the interests of a transparent methodology. The choice to use a multiple tally
should be noted and justified - hence the inclusion of this table here - the sentiment from the Harvard
Law Review accompanying n 25 is the guiding principle.
28 (2003)195ALR412.
29 (2003) 198 ALR 137.
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